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y purpose in this article is to 
comment favorably on a recent 
article by Judith Barad, an 
article which claimed that 
Thomas Aquinas was not a speciesist without 
qualification because he had an inconsistent atti-
tude toward animals. That is, Aquinas should 
have had a more favorable attitude toward 
animals than he apparently did because of some 
principles which were fundamental to his own 
thought. My comments will lead to some rather 
broad speculations regarding how we should view 
the history of thought on animals. 
Barad's article does not leave the taste one 
gets from that type of history of philosophy 
which returns to the past purely for the sake of 
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antiquarian lore, as would have been the 
case if she found out what Aquinas said 
about animals merely to fill one more niche 
in the historian's edifice, so that all topics in 
all philosophers would be commented on. 
She avoids another evil. That is, doing 
rancid violence to a past thinker through a 
crude {usually anachronistic} appropriation 
of him for the purposes of present philoso-
phizing. It should be noted, however, that at 
times it is quite legitimate to lean in this 
direction, as in the half-informed whipping 
and gnashing Descartes has received by 
defenders of animal rights. The legitimacy of 
these polemical uses of Descartes becomes 
apparent when we read John Cottingham's 
well-informed, nuanced, and nonetheless 
unconvincing attempt to make Descartes' 
view of animals more palatable.! 
It is difficult for us to tell whether it is 
Barad's philosophical sources which are being 
interpreted or if it is her interpretive efforts 
which are being textually grounded. Historical 
objectivity increases along with this difficulty. 
But perhaps the most complimentary thing 
I can say about Barad's article is that it made 
me think seriously about some of the biggest 
issues regarding the history of the philosophic 
treatment of animals, and, I confess, it made 
me revise some of my own views of that 
history. Specifically, as a consequence of 
Barad's article I think we should get clear on 
how our "from-to" perspective operates in the 
history of the philosophic treatment of 
animals and how our choice of such a per-
spective affects how we will digest the 
thought of a particular thinker or of a partic-
ular historical period. To take a preliminary 
example from outside the philosophic treat-
ment of animals, consider how one's 
approach to Kant's epistemology is affected 
not so much by which contemporary method-
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ology one uses to study Kant but by the fact 
that in the Anglo-American philosophical 
world Kant is usually studied as the culmina-
tion of the period from Descartes and Locke, 
whereas in Germany he is more often studied 
as the start of a period which ends with Hegel 
and Marx. This "mere" change in from-to 
perspective to some extent, at least, changes 
one's view of Kant.2 
Regarding the history of philosophic 
thought on animals I, at least, have focused 
on the following from-to perspective: from 
Pythagoras to Plotinus there were many 
thinkers who showed profound respect for 
animals, among them Pythagoras and Platinus 
themselves, as well as Plato, Theophrastus, 
Plutarch, and Porphyry. At the end of the 
classical period, however, the favorable treat-
ment of animals died out, for the most part, 
among philosophers until the nineteenth 
century. On the assumption that focusing on 
this from-to perspective gave the best vision of 
the past, the period from Aquinas to 
Descartes appeared to be one where the bad 
got worse, in that Descartes was, as Peter 
Singer puts it, the absolute nadir, Cotting-
ham's efforts to the contrary not withstand-
ing. A corollary of this from-to perspective 
was that one could easily understand the 
movement from Descartes to LaMettrie to 
factory farming and vivisection with equa-
nimity. That is, Descartes' view of animals as 
mere machines made it possible to view 
animals as commodities and mere objects for 
pithing. And Descartes' view of human 
beings as machines with mere ghosts in them 
led, as Leonora Rosenfield has shown,3 to 
LaMettrie's {not to mention Ryle's} rather 
convenient exorcism of the ghosts. 
As a consequence of Barad's article, 
however, we are forced to re-focus our histori-
cal lenses when we look at the transition from 
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Aquinas' (and Francis of Assisi's) thirteenth 
century to Descartes' seventeenth. Indeed, 
there is hardly a transition here at all, but 
rather a radical break. Because of Barad's 
article we are forced to ask: how does one get 
from Aquinas to Descartes? Both were anthro-
pocentrists, but Aquinas' epistemology, psy-
chology, and his Lovejoy-like great-chain-of-
being metaphysics militate against his anthro-
pocentrism - hence Barad's charge of incon-
sistency. Descartes is frustrating because he is 
so consistent. He views animals as machines, 
and there is very little, if anything, in his 
thought to indicate that he should have held 
otherwise. 
Might it be the case that all of the major 
pre-modem philosophers are either morally 
sympathetic to animals or are thinkers whose 
lack of moral sympathy with animals conflicts 
with claims that are central to these thinkers' 
philosophies? This is a broad claim, but con-
sider that the two major pre-modem oppo-
nents to what we today would call "animal 
rights" were Aristotle and Aquinas. The 
former's greatest pupil and literary executor, 
Theophrastus, made us aware of Aristotle's 
inconsistency regarding animals,4 and now a 
similar argument regarding Aquinas' inconsis-
tency is offered by Barad. 
If this broad claim is correct, or at least 
largely correct, one can easily imagine two 
reasons why it is so. First, almost all of the 
pre-modem philosophers believed in, or 
flirted with, either panpsychism or hylomor-
phism, positions which, it seems, are far more 
compatible with care for nonhuman nature 
than either Cartesian dualism (which sees 
most of nature as amenable for enslavement, 
with a few scattered minds strewn about as 
exceptions to the rule) or Cartesian dualism's 
assumed alternative in modem or contempo-
rary philosophy, some sort of materialistic or 
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mechanistic monism (in which one has the 
difficult project of justifying respect for any-
thing, even respect for human beings5). 
That is, in the effort to explain the appar-
ent differences between mental phenomena 
and terms, on the one hand, and bodily phe-
M ight it be the case that all of the major pre.. 
modern philosophers are either 
morally sympathetic to animals 
or are thinkers whose lack of 
moral sympathy with animals 
conflicts with claims that are 
central to these thinkers' 
philosophies? 
nomena and terms, on the other, three 
options logically exhaust the alternatives, the 
first two of which have dominated philosophy 
since Descartes. Either (1) this apparent 
duality is real, as Descartes suggested - a 
view which has disastrous consequences for 
animals - or (2) the mental phenomena and 
terms can in some way or other be reduced to 
bodily phenomena or terms - a view which 
also has disastrous consequences for animals, 
and perhaps for human beings as well, in that 
the basic constituents of reality are seen as 
inert, lifeless, devoid of internal significance. 
Moral significance arises tenuously only when 
these mechanical building blocks are config-
ured in certain (often arbitrary) ways, say 
when they make it possible for a human being 
eventually to utter propositions. On Richard 
Rorty's version of this view, moral significance 
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does not exist before such utterances can be 
made.6 But it is not often noticed these days 
that there is a second alternative to dualism. 
(3) One can attribute (on the grounds provid-
ed by several sorts of evidence) some mode of 
life or activity or form to the constituents even 
of bodily phenomena, thereby explaining how 
internal relations, and hence inherent value, 
are possible. Both (Platonic-Whiteheadian) 
panpsychism and (Aristotelian-Thomistic-
Peircian) hylomorphism are versions of this 
third view, which is not only compatible with, 
but actually provides the only possible meta-
physical foundation for, Tom Regan's theory of 
inherent value. (I make this suggestion in spite 
of the fact that Regan himself may not be par-
ticularly interested in metaphysical founda-
tions.) After reading the various criticisms of 
Regan's views, I think it is fair to say that what 
(unfortunately) bothers most people is not so 
much that Regan says that animals have 
inherent value, but that anything has inherent 
value. It should be noted that hardly any pre-
modern philosopher would criticize Regan on 
these grounds. 
A second reason can also be imagined 
which would support the broad claim made 
above regarding the significant gap between 
Aquinas and Descartes. It is often held that 
speciesism is due to the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion, and I think that there is some legitimacy 
to this claim. But the aforementioned gap 
between Aquinas and many, if not most, post-
Cartesian philosophical treatments of animals 
should force us to consider seriously the 
'origins of modem speciesism, a speciesism 
which is intensified by precisely those phe-
nomena in the history of ideas which made 
their first appearance in the period between 
Aquinas and Descartes. I speak of a supposed-
ly free market economy and its attendant, an 
exaggerated metaphysical individualism pos-
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sessed by human beings, an individualism 
which actually makes a virtue of amoral self-
interest, if not of selfishness.? 
I admit that the two most important 
defenders of animal rights in recent debates 
have both been involved in the continuation 
of intellectual projects started in post-Carte-
sian philosophy. Singer can be seen as the 
inheritor of Bentham's and Mill's concern for 
animals, and Regan's thought can be seen as a 
(peculiar) elaboration of principles found in 
Kant and G.E. More. But as a consequence of 
reading Barad's article, I am more convinced 
than ever that there is also a great deal to be 
learned from those contemporary defenders of 
animal rights who take as their starting points 
the classics of pre-modem philosophy; in par-
ticular I am thinking of Stephen R.L. Clark.8 
Clark is instructive regarding how the virtue-
based approach to ethics can supplement, at 
the very least, utilitarian and deontological 
defenses of animals. 
It is not my aim to deny any continuity 
between Aquinas and modern philosophers, 
say between Aquinas and Kant regarding the 
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claim that we do not owe respect to animals 
directly, but only indirectly when they are 
our neighbor's property. But even here dis, 
continuity should have the upper hand 
because property, for Aquinas, is legitimate 
only within the confines of some larger 
moral or theological purpose, whereas Kant 
travels a great distance down the road which 
leads to property as an absolute right for 
individual human beings. Once again, it is 
not insignificant to note that between these 
two thinkers lies the triumph of instrumental 
reason, of techne over sophia, of animals as 
industrial (or post' industrial) tools. 
I should end, I suppose, by apologizing for 
not talking about Barad's article directly, but 
I hope it is clear that what I have said is 
indirectly connected to her article. It is 
because Aristotle's and Aquinas' positions 
regarding animals are so complex that I have 
suggested that we re-focus our from-to per-
spectives so as to consider in detail the 
period from Aquinas to Descartes, in particu, 
lar, and from pre'modem to modem philoso-
phy, in general. 
And I have at least threatened to show in 
a short space that such a re-focusing would 
have important consequences for how we 
should think about the influence of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition on thought about 
animals, but more importantly for how we 
should think about the influence of modem 
political economy on thought regarding 
animals and about the contemporary dogma 
that if Cartesian dualism is untenable then 
the only alternative is some variety of mate-
rialistic monism. Such a re,focusing, I also 
allege, would allow us to see some worth, 
while features of virtue,based ethics not 
mentioned by Alasdair Macintyre. In short, 
such a re,focusing of from,to perspective 
would make defenders of animal rights a bit 
more eager to become armchair classicists 
and medievalists. 
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